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The debate rages on about how to tax private equity fund managers
and hedge fund managers who, as part of their compensation, receive rights
to share in fund profits ("carried interests"). Commentators have paid
relatively little attention, however, to the impact that proposals to change the
tax treatment of fund managers will have on fund investors, other than to
suggest that investors could suffer because managers may try to raise
management fees or because overall fund profitability may decline. This
Article argues that there is a much subtler reason why the carried interest tax
proposals that are aimed at fund managers pose economic risks to fund
investors. The reason is that a change to the tax treatment of carried interests
changes the economic relationship that investors and managers created and
consented to in their fund agreement, often after extensive negotiations.
Specifically, the proposed increase in tax rates on carried interests, when
coupled with common provisions found in fund agreements (namely,
"clawback" provisions and "tax distribution" provisions), increases the risk
that the economic burden of losses will be shifted from the managers to the
investors without compensation; incentivizes managers to take more risk
when managing fund assets; otherwise erodes the alignment of
manager/investor incentives; and delays the return of investors' capital
contributions, thereby imposing a time-value-of-money cost on the investors.
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This Article explains the indirect route through which the carried
interest tax proposals create these return-reducing ripple effects. This Article
also provides guidance to investors about how they can protect themselves
from harm. More broadly, this Article illustrates how changes in law can
alter the economic relationships to which private parties consented under
carefully negotiated contracts, thereby creating unintended (and potentially
adverse) consequences to parties who are not the desired targets of the law
change.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past few years, there has been a vigorous debate about how
to tax private equity fund managers, venture capital fund managers, and
hedge fund managers who, as part of their compensation, receive rights to
share in fund profits ("carried interests").' Recently, Mitt Romney's
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presidential campaign has intensified this debate because part of Romney's
immense wealth comes from tax-advantaged carried interests that he
received in connection with his work with the private equity firm of Bain
Capital.2 Despite the robust academic, legislative, and media discussions
about carried interests, relative little attention has been paid to the way in
which fund investors3 could be impacted by proposals to change the way
fund managers (like Romney) are taxed on carried interests.4 Some of the
1. See, e.g., Noel B. Cunningham & Mitchell L. Engler, The Carried
Interest Controversy: Let's Not Get Carried Away, 61 TAX L. REV. 121 (2008);
Victor Fleischer, Two and Twenty: Taxing Partnership Profits in Private Equity
Funds, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (2008) [hereinafter Fleisher, Two and Twenty]; Philip F.
Postlewaite, Fifteen & Thirty-Five--Class Warfare in Subchapter K of the Internal
Revenue Code: The Taxation of Human Capital Upon the Receipt of a Proprietary
Interest in a Business Enterprise, 28 VA. TAX REV. 817 (2009); David A. Weisbach,
The Taxation of Carried Interests in Private Equity, 94 VA. L. REV. 715 (2008);
Karen C. Burke, The Sound and Fury of Carried Interest Reform, I COLUM. J. TAX
L. 1 (2010) [Burke, Sound and Fury].
2. See, e.g., Heidi Przybyla & David J. Lynch, Carried Interest Debate in
Spotlight Amid Romney Tax Release (Feb 1, 2012), http://www.businessweek.
com/news/2012-02-01 /carried-interest-debate-in-spotlight-amid-romney-tax-release.
html; Peter Lattman, Romney Disclosure Reignites Debate Over Carried Interests
(Jan. 17, 2012), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/01/1 7/romney-disclosure-
reignites-debate-over-carried-interest-tax/; Daniel Schafer & Richard McGregor,
Bain Chiefs May Rue the Romney Factor (Jan. 30, 2012) http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/
4b2d88e8-4b60- llel-b980-00144feabdc0.html#axzzlm7vHuo1A; The Daily Show
with Jon Stewart at 2:15-6:20 (Jan. 24, 2012) http://www.thedailyshow.com/full-
episodes/tue-january-24-2012-elizabeth-warren.
3. References herein to funds and fund investors refer to private equity
funds, venture capital fumds, hedge fhnds, and similar investment or real estate funds
that are largely unregulated and whose managers are compensated, at least in part,
based on a percentage of the fund's profits. In contrast, this Article does not address
mutual funds or other funds that are subject to significant regulation by the U.S.
government or whose managers' compensation is based on something other than a
percentage of the fund's profits.
4. This may be because some commentators conclude that fund investors
are unlikely to be materially affected by the proposals. See, e.g., Alan J. Auerbach,
U C. Berkeley Professor Recommends Capital Gains Tax Reform, 2007 TAX NOTES
TODAY 174-57 (Sept. 6, 2007) (concluding that "[i]f half of the tax increase were
shifted to investors, this.., would imply a reduction of at most around 2 basis points
in the annual return [for investors] . . . and quite possibly much less."); Orin S.
Kramer, Hedge Fund Manager Dismisses Claims that Higher Taxes on Private
Equity Would Harm Pension Funds, 2007 TAX NOTES TODAY 174-46 (Sept. 6,
2007). Additionally, the limited attention to fund investors may be because investors
in funds are generally sophisticated parties who, except for investors that are
pensions and charitable foundations, are relatively unsympathetic constituencies. Cf
Stephen Labaton & Jenny Anderson, Pension Effect From Tax Plan is Called Slight,
2012]
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commentators that do address the consequences for fund investors suggest
that managers may try to pass along part of their increased tax burden by, for
example, increasing management fees or increasing the size of the managers'
carried interests.5 Other commentators believe that fund investors' returns
are likely to be reduced because of the overall harm these commentators
believe will befall the economy and the fund industry if the carried interest
proposals pass.6 But the impact on fund investors deserves more careful
analysis, particularly because public and private pension funds, foundations,
and endowments (and not merely wealthy private individuals) are typically
the majority investors in funds. This Article provides this analysis.
This Article argues that, while the limited commentary correctly
identifies the possibility that proposals to change the tax treatment of carried
interests could reduce returns to fund investors, there is a much subtler and
more troubling reason for these reduced returns. The reason is that a change
to the tax treatment of carried interests changes the economic relationship
that investors and managers created and to which they consented in their
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 2007, at CI (noting that "critics of the tax proposals have
maintained that fund managers would pass on any increase to investors, thus
lowering the returns of pension funds that millions of Americans rely upon for their
retirement.").
5. See, e.g., Leon M. Metzger, Former Hedge Fund Vice Chair Testifies on
Use of Offshore Hedge Funds, 2007 TAx NOTES TODAY 174-55 (Sept. 6, 2007)
(responding to arguments "that if all carried interests were taxed at ordinary rates, it
might lead to fund managers' increasing their compensation beyond the typical '2
and 20' arrangement, which would reduce the returns of investors like pension plans
and endowments"); Bruce Rosenblum, Private Equity Council Chair Testifies on
Carried Interest Taxation, 2007 TAx NOTES TODAY 174-49 (Sept. 6, 2007) ("PE
sponsors may look at ways to offset the higher tax burden through changes in
economic terms that will adversely impact their LPs.").
6. See, e.g., Diana Furchtgott-Roth, Skewing the Playing Field for
Investment Partnerships, 127 TAX NOTES 1291 (June 14, 2010) (arguing that
increased taxes on carried interests may lead to less efficient capital markets,
resulting in harm to investors); Jack S. Levin, Kirkland & Ellis Partner Argues
Against Taxation of Carried Interests as Ordinary Income, 2007 TAX NOTES TODAY
174-47 (Sept. 6, 2007) (arguing that taxing carried interest as ordinary income poses
a "substantial risk [that] the flow of entrepreneurial investments will indeed be
reduced, with significant harm to our vibrant economy[,]" which in turn could harm
pension funds and university endowments that invest in the funds, thereby harming
American workers and students).
7. See Preqin Special Report, Institutional Investor Outlook for Hedge
Funds in 2012, fig. 8 (Nov. 2011) http://www.preqin.com/docs/reports/
Preqin SpecialReportHedge Funds_2012.pdf (showing that more than 50 percent
of hedge fund investors are foundations, endowments, or pension funds); J. COMM.
TAx'N, PRESENT LAW AND ANALYSIS RELATING TO TAX TREATMENT OF
PARTNERSHIP CARRIED INTERESTS, (JCX-41-007) 37 (July 10, 2007) (same for
venture capital funds).
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fund agreement, often after extensive negotiations An increase of the tax
rate applicable to managers' carried interests alters the way in which
investors are impacted by common fund agreement provisions, namely
"clawback" provisions9 and "tax distribution" provisions. 10 Among other
consequences, investors face the possibility that the economic burden of a
larger amount of fund losses will be shifted from the managers to the
investors without compensation; investors suffer an increased likelihood that
the managers will take risks that exceed the amount of risk to which the
investors intended to consent when originally investing pursuant to the fund
agreement; investors sustain other erosions of the alignment of
manager/investor economic incentives with respect to the management of
fund assets; and investors incur greater time-value-of-money costs arising
because the fund may not return their capital contributions as quickly as
expected. Fundamentally, an increase in the tax rate applicable to carried
interests, when coupled with clawback provisions and tax distribution
provisions in fund agreements, can result in these economic distortions
because managers must pay tax on the allocations of the carry throughout the
life of the fund and because those interim carry allocations may not
accurately reflect a manager's ultimate entitlement (based on the aggregate
fund earnings over the entire life of the fund).
Fund investors may be able to protect themselves from these adverse
consequences by negotiating with managers about the fund agreement that
creates their economic relationship. But the investors must first understand
the indirect route through which they could be adversely affected by the
carried interest proposals. Thus, the goals of this Article are to explain how,
and in what circumstances, the carried interest tax proposals are likely to
8. Extensive negotiations among sophisticated parties generally reflect a
joint-tax perspective; that is, the parties will negotiate against the backdrop of the
existing tax law in order to maximize their aggregate welfare (minimize their
aggregate tax) and share the tax savings among them. See generally Chris William
Sanchirico, The Tax Advantage To Paying Private Equity Fund Managers with
Profit Shares: What is it? Why is it Bad?, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1071, 1077-79 (2008);
Burke, Sounds and Fury, supra note 1, at 2-5, 23-24; Ethan Yale & Gregg D.
Polsky, Reforming the Taxation of Deferred Compensation, 85 N.C. L. REv. 571,
579-80 (2007).
9. As will be explained in more detail in Part III.A. 1., under a "clawback"
provision, a manager can be obligated to return money to the fund if it turns out that
early distributions to the manager from the fund exceeded the amount of the profit to
which the manager is ultimately entitled.
10. As will be explained in more detail in Part III.B.I., under a "tax
distribution" provision, a fund makes distributions of cash to partners in amounts




adversely affect fund investors, and to provide some guidance to investors
about how to respond to these consequences.
More broadly, this Article illustrates how changes in the law can
alter the economic relationships to which private parties consented under
carefully negotiated contracts, thereby creating unintended (and potentially
adverse) consequences to parties who are not the desired targets of the law
change. Query the extent to which legislators considering changes to the law
ought to take into account these types of secondary effects that are created
when a change in law ripples through previously established economic
relationships.
Several caveats are warranted before moving to the rest of the
Article.
First, this Article takes no position on whether Congress should pass
legislation to increase the tax rate applicable to carried interests. This is not
because I am indifferent. I have an opinion on the issue, but I do not think
that the potential indirect impact of the legislation on fund investors adds
much, if anything, to that normative debate. On the other hand, the analysis
of the potential impact on fund investors is (I hope) quite useful (1) as fund
investors contemplate how, if at all, they should change their behavior if the
legislation is enacted, (2) as scholars and businesspeople continue to develop
their understanding of the agency relationship between managers and
investors in the private fund context, and (3) as scholars and legislators
consider alternatives for tax reform, taking into account how changes in the
law can alter the economic consequences of pre-existing contractually-
created relationships among private parties.
Second, this Article does not, on its face, distinguish between
investors in private equity funds, investors in venture capital funds, and
investors in hedge funds." Clearly, the presence and magnitude of the issues
discussed herein will vary depending on factors including the type of fund,
the fund's particular investment strategy, the fund's method for calculating
the carry, and the fund's timeframe for distributing the carry to the manager.
Thus, rather than focusing on specific categories of funds, I focus on fund
agreement features - particularly clawbacks and tax distributions - that
are likely to increase economic risks to investors.
12
Third, this Article assumes that the carried interest tax proposals, if
enacted, would increase the tax rate applicable to a substantial amount of the
11. See generally Adam H. Rosenzweig, Not All Carried Interests are
Created Equal, 29 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 713, 716-21 (2009) (providing a nice
explanation of major differences between private equity funds and hedge funds)
[hereinafter Rosenzweig, Carried Interest]; see also Andrew W. Needham &
Christian Brause, Hedge Funds, 736 Tax Mgmt. (BNA) III.A. (2011) [hereinafter
Needham & Brause, Hedge Funds].
12. Note that these features are generally less common in hedge funds than
in private equity funds. Needham & Brause, Hedge Funds, supra note 11, at III.C.
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General Partner's (GP's) carry. That is, this Article assumes (1) that the
manager of the fund (or an affiliate of the manager) is the fund's GP 13 and is
a taxable U.S. person(s) or is a flow-through vehicle comprised of or
ultimately owned by a taxable U.S. person(s), 14 and (2) that the relevant
funds earn a substantial amount of income that is characterized as long term
capital gain (LTCG), such that a substantial amount of the carry is taxable to
the GP at a 15 percent federal income tax rate. 5
Finally, in order to focus on the impact of the increase in federal
income taxes, the examples in this Article use only federal (and not state)
income tax rates.16 Thus, this Article assumes a 15 percent rate for LTCG
and a 40 percent rate for ordinary income (because 40 percent allows for
relatively easy calculations and because top marginal rates may go back up
to 39.6 percent).
With those caveats out of the way, the remainder of the Article will
proceed as follows. Part II will provide background about fund manager
compensation and the carried interest tax proposals. Part III will discuss the
potential problems posed for fund investors by an increase in the tax rate
applicable to carried interests, and will focus on two particular features of
fund agreements - clawbacks (covered in Part III.A.) and tax distributions
(covered in Part III.B.) - that raise these issues. For each feature, I will
describe how the fund agreement provision typically works, explain how an
increase in the tax rate applicable to carried interests could change how the
provision affects fund investors, and provide suggestions for fund investors
to consider in response. Part IV concludes.
13. In some funds, the manager bifurcates its economic interests between
two affiliated entities. See Gregg D. Polsky, Private Equity Management Fee
Conversions, 122 TAX NOTES 743, 745-49 (Feb. 9, 2009). For simplicity, the
remainder of this discussion sets this distinction aside.
14. The GP of investment funds are typically LLCs or LPs in which
individuals are the interest-holders. See JACK S. LEVIN, STRUCTURING VENTURE
CAPITAL, PRIVATE EQUITY, AND ENTREPRENEURIAL TRANSACTIONS 1006.1 (2011)
[hereinafter LEVIN, VENTURE CAPITAL]; Needham & Brause, Hedge Funds, supra
note 11, at VI.C.
15. Note that this assumption means that this Article's analysis is likely less
applicable to hedge funds than to private equity funds because the investment
strategies of hedge funds rarely produce long term capital gain. See Rosenzweig,
Carried Interests, supra note 11, at 718.
16. Note that this disregards possible employment tax consequences of the
carried interest proposals. Currently, a GP's carried interest is generally not subject
to employment tax, but proposals to change the tax treatment of carried interest
contemplate the possibility of subjecting the carry to employment taxes. If this
employment tax issue is taken into account, the return-reducing ripple effects




Brief overviews of fund manager compensation and the proposed
legislation provide background for the analysis.' 7 Readers familiar with these
topics may wish to skip directly to Part Il.
A. Brief Overview of the Structure and Taxation of Fund Manager
Compensation
Private equity funds, venture capital funds, and hedge funds are
typically structured as limited partnerships, in which the investors are the
limited partners (LPs) and the manager is the GP. Managers of these funds
generally receive two different economic rights in exchange for their
services. First, the manager is paid a management fee, commonly equal to 2
percent of assets under management. Second, the manager is granted a right
to share in the profits of the fund. Typically, this "carried interest" or "carry"
entitles the manager to 20 percent of the profits earned by the fund. Details
of the carried interest vary from fund to fund. These details include (1) when
the manager is entitled to receive distributions on account of the carried
interest (including distributions of the manager's entire share of profits or
distributions of smaller amounts of money that are intended to be sufficient
to enable the manager to pay taxes due on the manager's share of profits
("tax distributions")),'8 and (2) whether and to what extent the manager is
obligated to return money to the fund if it turns out that early distributions of
carry exceeded the amount of the profit to which the manager was ultimately
17. See generally LEVIN, VENTURE CAPITAL, supra note 14, at ch. 10;
Andrew W. Needham, Private Equity Funds, 735-2d Tax Mgmt. (BNA) pts. III &
V-VI (2011) [hereinafter Needham, Private Equity Funds]; Needham & Brause,
Hedge Funds, supra note 11, at pts. III & V-VI; Ronald J. Gilson, Engineering a
Venture Capital Market: Lessons from the American Experience, 55 STAN. L. REV.
1067, 1070-78 & 1088-90 (2003) [hereinafter Gilson, Venture Capital Market];
Henry Ordower, Demystifying Hedge Funds: A Design Primer, 7 U.C. DAVIS Bus.
L.J. 324 (2007); Stephanie R. Breslow, Selected Excerpts from PLI's Private Equity
Funds: Formation and Operation, 1st ed., Chapter 2: Terms of Private Equity
Funds, 1782 PRACTISING LAW INST. CORP. LAW & PRACTICE COURSE HANDBOOK
225 (2010) [hereinafter Breslow, Selected Excerpts].
18. See generally LEVIN, VENTURE CAPITAL, supra note 14, at 1003.5;
Needham & Brause, Hedge Funds, supra note 11, at III.B.; Breslow, Selected
Excerpts, supra note 17, at §§ 2.7.3, 2.8.1[D][4]; see, e.g., Gregory J. Nowak, Hedge
Fund Agreements Line by Line: A User's Guide to LLC Operating Contracts 2nd
ed., ASPATORE LINE-BY-LINE 1, 7.10 (2009) [hereinafter Nowak, Hedge Fund
Agreements], (providing sample language); Dow JONES, PRIVATE EQUITY
PARTNERSHIP TERMS & CONDITIONS 47 (2009) [hereinafter Dow JONES,
PARTNERSHIP].
[Vol13:1I
"Carried Interest" Tax Proposals
entitled (a "clawback" obligation). 19 The fund agreement provisions
regarding the calculation of the GP's carried interest, including the clawback
provision in particular, are among the most heavily negotiated provisions in
fund agreements and are among the most important provisions to both GPs
and LPs.2 °
The management fee and the carried interest are subject to different
federal income tax treatments. The management fee is just salary
compensation, and thus, it is taxed to the manager at ordinary income rates.
21
The taxation of the carried interest is more complicated. Generally, the
manager is not subject to tax upon the initial receipt of the carried interest.22
Rather, the manager is taxed on its allocable share of the fund's profits, if
and as the fund recognizes income.2 3 The character of that income to the
manager generally depends on the character of the income to the fund.
24
19. See generally LEVIN, VENTURE CAPITAL, supra note 14, at 1003.1-.4;
Needham & Brause, Hedge Funds, supra note 11, at III.B.; Needham, Private Equity
Funds, supra note 17, at Worksheet 3 (providing sample language); Breslow,
Selected Excerpts, supra note 17, at § 2.8.1 [G]; Dow JONES, PARTNERSHIP, supra
note 18, at 42. There are a number of other details of carried interests that vary from
fund to fund, including whether the manager shares in profit from the first dollar or
whether the manager shares in profit only after a specific "hurdle rate" of return has
been achieved. See generally Dow JONES, PARTNERSHIP, supra note 18 (providing
details about the prevalence of a wide variety of terms in private equity fund
agreements). However, I highlight the issues of tax distributions and clawbacks
because, as discussed later, these are the features of carried interests that may lead to
return-reducing results for fund investors if the tax rate applicable to carried interests
is increased.
20. Center for Private Equity and Entrepreneurship, Tuck School of
Business at Dartmouth, Limited Partnership Agreement Survey Results - GPs 11-12,
38-39 (June 2004) http:/mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pecenter/research/pdf/survey_
resultsGP.pdf; Center for Private Equity and Entrepreneurship, Tuck School of
Business at Dartmouth, Limited Partnership Agreement Survey Results - LPs 9-10,
36-37 (June 2004) http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pecenter/research/pdf/survey_
resultsLP.pdf [hereinafter Tuck, LP Agreement Survey - LPs].
21. I.R.C. § 61. This basic description of the tax treatment for management
fees assumes that there has been no effort to recharacterize the management fee into
an increased carry.
22. A carried interest is merely one version of what the partnership tax law
refers to as a "profits interest" - a partnership interest that has a liquidation value of
zero as of the time of grant and that is granted in exchange "for the provision of
services to or for the benefit of a partnership in a partner capacity or in anticipation
of being a partner[.I" Rev. Proc. 93-27, 1993-2 C.B. 343. Profits interests, and hence
carried interests, are generally not subject to tax upon grant. Id. There are a variety
of proposals to change the tax treatment of the carried interest, and these will be
addressed in Part I1.B. infra.
23. I.R.C. §§ 702(a), 704.
24. I.R.C. § 702(b).
2012]
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Thus, if the fund's income is entirely LTCG (as is much of the income in
private equity funds in particular), then the manager generally pays tax at
long term capital gains rates on the income allocable to the manager on
account of the carried interest.
25
B. Legislative Proposals Regarding the Taxation of Carried Interests
Many commentators criticize the current tax treatment of carried
interests, arguing that the income earned by the managers on account of the
carried interest is compensation for services and ought to be taxed at
ordinary income rates like other labor income.26 For example, one of the
criticisms of Mitt Romney is that it is unfair that Romney was able to pay tax
at capital gains rates on income earned as a result of his work at Bain
Capital, while other people pay tax on labor income at higher ordinary
income tax rates.27 In response to the critiques of the tax treatment of carried
interests, legislators, commentators, and most recently, the president, have
put forward proposals that would change the tax treatment of carried
interests.21 While some of the details vary from proposal to proposal, the
25. Fund managers do not always pay tax at LTCG rates on the income
allocable to them on account of their carried interests. If, for example, the fund earns
interest, rent, or other ordinary income, then the manager will pay tax on its share of
that income at ordinary income rates. However, as mentioned in the introduction,
this Article assumes that the fund's income consists largely of LTCG income. To the
extent that fund income allocated to the manager would be characterized as ordinary
income to the fund (more common in hedge funds), the income would already be
ordinary income to the manager, and the carried interest legislation would not
change the tax result (except to the extent that the carried interest legislation imposes
employment taxes on the carry). See supra note 16.
26. See, e.g., Fleischer, Two and Twenty, supra note 1; Mark P. Gergen,
Reforming Subchapter K: Compensating Service Partners, 48 TAx L. REv. 69 (1992)
(proposing that "a compensatory allocation to a partner [such as an allocation on
account of a carried interest] be treated [for tax purposes] as salary paid by the
partnership").
27. See, e.g., Jack 0. Nutter, Private Equity, Carried Interest and Mitt
Romney (Jan. 18, 2012), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/private-equity-carried-
interest-and-mitt-romney-2012-01-18; see also supra note 2.
28. See, e.g., American Jobs Act of 2011, H.R. 12, 112th Cong. § 412
(2011) (reflecting President Obama's proposal to tax 100 percent of carried interest
allocations as ordinary income); American Jobs and Closing Tax Loopholes Act of
2010, H.R. 4213, 11 1th Cong. Sess. § 412 (2d. Sess. (2010) (provision passed by the
House to tax 50-75 percent of carried interest allocations as ordinary income, but
excluded from the final legislation); H.R. 2834, 110th Cong. (2007) (original
proposal, introduced by Rep. Sander M. Levin, to tax all carried interest allocations
as ordinary income).
[Vol 13:1
"Carried Interest" Tax Proposals
proposals typically seek to tax all or part of the return on carried interests as
ordinary income rather than capital gain.29
The nuanced differences between these proposals are generally
irrelevant for purposes of this Article's analysis, so I will not belabor those
details here. It is enough, for purposes of this Article, to know that the
carried interest proposals generally would cause fund managers to be taxed at
ordinary income rates on some or all of their share of fund profits attributable
to the carried interests. For funds that earn income that is characterized as
LTCG, enactment of any of these proposals would increase the tax rate
applicable to income allocated to the GP on account of the GP's carried
interest.
I1. THE CIRCUITOUS ROUTE BETWEEN INCREASED TAXES ON FUND
MANAGERS AND REDUCED RETURNS FOR FUND INVESTORS
Query how an increase in the tax rate applicable to fund managers'
carried interests might affect fund investors. Commentators note that carried
interest proposals may adversely affect overall fund profits, in which
investors share, and that managers may try to pass along to fund investors
part of their increased tax costs by, for example, increasing management fees
or increasing the carry rate.30
There is a much subtler reason, however, that investors may suffer
reduced returns if taxes on fund managers are increased. Specifically, a
change to the tax treatment of carried interests changes the economic
relationships that managers and investors intended to create under their fund
agreements. Under clawback provisions and tax distribution provisions, both
of which are commonly found in fund agreements, an increase in the tax rate
applicable to managers' carried interests can (unless the fund agreements are
changed in response to a change in the tax treatment of carried interests) 31
increase the risk that the economic burden of losses will be shifted from the
managers to the investors without compensation, lead managers to take more
risk than they take now, otherwise erode the alignment of manager/investor
29. See supra note 28. The proposals changed over time to address
comments, to incorporate technical modifications, and to reflect attempts at
compromise. However, the proposals generally reflect the basic concept of taxing at
least some portion of carried interest allocations as ordinary income.
30. See supra notes 5 & 6.
31. The analysis in this Article assumes that the carry, clawback, and tax
distribution provisions of fund agreements are not changed in response to the change
in the tax treatment of carried interests. This assumption enables the Article to
explain the harms that could befall investors if the taxation of carried interests is
changed and investors indeed fail to negotiate for changes to these fund agreements.
In response to these potential adverse consequences, this Article makes
recommendations about how investors might want to change the fund agreements.
2012]
Florida Tax Review
incentives, and delay the return of investor capital contributions, thereby
imposing a time-value-of-money cost on the investors. These consequences
may be surprising because they arise indirectly, largely as a result of the way
taxes affect the operation of common fund agreement provisions.
If, however, fund investors appreciate how they can be adversely
affected by legislation that is nominally targeted at fund managers, fund
investors can better protect themselves from harm by paying careful attention
to, and negotiating about, the clawback provisions and the tax distribution
provisions in fund agreements. This section addresses both provisions, and
for each provision, explains the provision, the risks to investors that could
arise from the provision if taxes on carried interests increase, and the
potential investor responses.
Clawback provisions, which create the more complex and likely
more problematic consequences for fund investors, are examined first. Then,
this section discusses tax distribution provisions, which can also adversely
affect investors if tax rates on carried interests increase.
A. Clawback Provisions
To the extent that the fund makes any carry distributions to the GP
during the life of the fund, fund agreements typically include some type of
clawback provision in order to recoup excess distributions of carry to the
GP. 32 The efficacy and impact of clawback provisions33 can change if tax
rates on the GP's carry increase, and LPs should be sensitive to these
potential changes particularly given that many LPs consider clawbacks to be
among the most important economic provisions in the fund agreement.34
This section explains how clawback provisions can help protect LPs
in general, and how the operation of a clawback provision is affected by
taxes on the GP's carry. Then, with this background, this section analyzes
how and to what extent an increase in the tax rate applicable to the GP's
carry can exacerbate the possibility of shifting losses from the GP to the LP
and the possibility that the GP will be incentivized to take increased risk.
Finally, this section provides some suggestions to LPs who want to limit the
32. See Needham, Private Equity Funds, supra note 17, at III.B.4.
(discussing clawbacks) and Worksheet 3 (providing language for a sample clawback
provision); LEVIN, VENTURE CAPITAL, supra note 14, at 1003.2-.4.
33. Admittedly, clawback provisions may not work perfectly now to protect
LPs from potential over-distributions to GPs. This is particularly true if no portion of
the GP's carry is segregated into an escrow from which the clawback obligation can
be fulfilled. See Dow JONES, PARTNERSHIP, supra note 18, at 42-43 (discussing the
prevalence of clawback guarantees and escrows). However, the carried interest tax
proposals can make clawback provisions less effective; this is true even if the
clawback provision is coupled with an escrow. See infra note 67.
34. See Tuck, LP Agreement Survey - LPs, supra note 20, at 9-10.
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amount of additional risk that they assume as a result of the interaction
between clawback provisions and an increase in taxes on carried interests.
1. Understanding Clawbacks
A fund risks distributing too much value to the GP if the GP's carry
is calculated based on the fund's aggregate profits over the life of the entire
fund 35 and the fund makes cash distributions throughout the life of the fund
(i.e., before the amount of the GP's total carry is finally determined).36 This
problem could arise if, for example, early transactions produce profits
(seemingly entitling the GP to a large carry), while later transactions produce
losses (reducing the size of the total carry to which the GP is ultimately
entitled).
In order to protect LPs' economic interests in this situation, fund
agreements often contain clawback provisions, which require the GP to
return part of the previously distributed carry, so that the GP only retains an
amount equal to 20 percent of the aggregate profit earned by the fund. The
basic concept is relatively straightforward, but a fair bit of background is
needed in order to appreciate how increased taxes on carried interests can
make a clawback less effective at protecting LPs. Examples are helpful in
providing this background.
(a) Example #1 - How Can LPs Be Harmed in the
Absence of a Clawback?
(1) Hypothetical & Analysis
Most fund agreements have some sort of clawback, 7 but to
appreciate the importance of a clawback, imagine a fund agreement that
entitles the GP to a 20 percent carry on the fund's aggregate profits and that
35. The risk of over-distribution of the carry and, thus, the need for a
clawback provision are avoided if the carry is calculated on an investment-by-
investment basis without aggregation or is calculated in another way in which carry
amounts, once calculated, would not be reduced by subsequent losses. See Needham
& Brause, Hedge Funds, supra note 11, at III.C. (noting that hedge fund carries are
typically calculated this way, vitiating the need for clawback provisions). Of course,
calculating the carry on an investment-by-investment basis changes the economics
and means that GPs will earn carries on deals that succeed, but will not suffer
monetary losses with respect to deals that do not succeed.
36. This is quite common particularly in private equity funds. See
Needham, Private Equity Funds, supra note 17, at III.B.3 & II.B.4.
37. See Dow JONES, PARTNERSHIP, supra note 18, at 42.
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lacks a clawback.3" Assume that five LPs each contribute $200 to the fund,3
and the fund immediately uses that $1000 to invest in two assets: Asset A is
purchased for $400, and Asset B is purchased for $600.40
Assume that, during Year 2, after Asset A has increased in value, the
GP causes the fund to sell Asset A for $550 cash, generating a profit of $150.
Twenty percent of this profit ($30) is allocated to GP,4' and the remainder of
the profit ($120) is allocated to the LPs. If the fund makes distributions of
all cash available, the fund would distribute the entire $550 of proceeds from
the sale of Asset A. Specifically, if the fund agreement first provides for a
return of the LPs' capital contributions with respect to the particular
investment and then provides for a distribution of profits, a total of $30
would be distributed to the GP on account of the GP's carried interest, and
the remaining $520 would be distributed to the LPs (consisting of $120 of
profit earned on Asset A and $400 return of capital).4
3
38. For ease, assume that the GP is entitled to the carry on the first dollar of
profit, with no hurdle rate, and that there are no management fees or expenses.
39. Assume, for purposes of simplicity of calculations, that the GP does not
make a capital contribution. Typically, a GP makes some capital contribution (often
0.2 percent of the total capital) both (1) so that, from a business perspective, the GP
has "skin in the game," thereby better aligning the GP's interests with the LP's
interests, and (2) to provide comfort that the GP will be treated as a true partner for
federal income tax purposes. See generally Rev. Proc. 89-12, 1989-1 C.B. 798
(setting out a 1 percent standard as the minimum contribution to be a partner,
declining to 0.2 percent for large partnerships), obsoleted by Rev. Rul. 2003-99,
2003-2 C.B. 388; Breslow, Selected Excerpts, supra note 17, at § 2.5.3. Although
Rev. Proc. 89-12 is obsolete, practitioners still use it to provide an indication about
the level of investment the IRS may require to establish "partner status." See, e.g.,
Eric B. Sloan & Matthew Sullivan, Deceptive Simplicity: Continuing and Current
Issues with Guaranteed Payments, 933 PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE: THE
CORPORATE TAX PRACTICE SERIES: STRATEGIES FOR ACQUISITIONS, DISPOSITIONS,
SPIN-OFFS, JOINT VENTURES, FINANCINGS, REORGANIZATIONS & RESTRUCTURING
87-1, n.86 (2010).
40. At this point, each of the LPs has an outside basis and capital account of
$200, and the GP has a zero outside basis and zero capital account. I.R.C. § 722;
Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iv)(b)(1).
41. This takes the GP's outside basis to $30 and the GP's capital account to
$30. I.R.C. § 705(a)(1); Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iv)(b)(3).
42. Assuming that the LPs are equal partners, the $120 allocated to the LPs
would be split among the 5 LPs, so each would receive an allocation of $22. As a
result, each LP would have an outside basis and a capital account of $222. I.R.C. §
705(a)(1); Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iv)(b)(3).
43. See, e.g., LEVIN, VENTURE CAPITAL, supra note 14, at 1003.4
(describing this as a "middle ground" approach to distributions). As a result, each LP
ends up with an outside basis and a capital account of $120, and the GP ends up with
an outside basis and a capital account of zero. I.R.C. § 733; Reg. § 1.704-
1(b)(2)(iv)(b)(4). The same distributions would be made in the example if the fund
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If, in Year 3, Asset B declines in value to $500 and the GP causes
the fund to sell it at that price, the fund would experience a $100 loss on that
asset. As a result, the net profit earned by the fund during its life would be
$50 ($150 gain from Asset A minus $100 loss from Asset B). Thus, the GP
should only be entitled to a total carry of $10 (20 percent of the $50 net
profit), and the remaining net profit ($40) should belong to the LPs. But, the
GP already received a distribution of $30 during Year 2. Because an early
transaction produced profits and a later transaction produced losses, the fund
distributed too much money to the GP.
In the absence of a fund agreement provision to the contrary, the
$500 proceeds from the sale of Asset B would be distributed to the LPs as a
return of the LPs' capital contribution. That is, rather than allocating the
$100 loss $20 to the GP and $80 to the LPs, the entire $100 of loss is
allocated to the LPs.4 Thus, upon a distribution in accordance with capital
accounts,45 the LPs only receive a total distribution of $500.46 As a result, the
agreement first provided for distribution of profits, followed by a return of the LPs'
capital contributions with respect to the investment, but this distribution scheme is
relatively uncommon. Id at 1003.2. If, however, the fund agreement provided that
the LPs are entitled to a return of their entire capital contributions before the GP
receives any distribution (other than tax distributions), this example would operate a
little differently. Id. at 1003.1, .5 (describing this distribution scheme). Specifically,
a tax distribution of $4.50 (15 percent of $30 profits) would be made to the GP, and
the remaining $545.50 would be distributed to the LPs. In this situation, the amounts
of the distributions are different than in the example from the text, but this scenario
still raises the clawback problem described in this section because, as will be noted
later, clawback obligations are generally net of taxes. See infra Part III.A. 1.c.
44. Technically, the allocations would work as follows: Typically, losses
would be allocated first to reverse prior allocations of profit. See LEVIN, VENTURE
CAPITAL, supra note 14, at 1002.2. Thus, $80 of the loss (80 percent) would be
allocated to the LPs, and $20 of the loss (20 percent) would be allocated to the GP
(bringing the GP's net profit allocation down from $30 to the GP's rightful $10
carry). However, in the absence of a deficit restoration obligation (which GPs in
investment funds typically do not have except to the extent of any clawback), an
allocation of a $20 loss to the GP would create a deficit balance in the GP's capital
account. Thus, an allocation of a $20 loss to the GP would lack substantial economic
effect, and the allocation would not be respected for federal income tax purposes.
I.R.C. § 704(b); Regs. §§ 1.704-1(b)(2)(ii)(b), 1.704-1(b)(2)(ii)(d). As a result, the
partnership tax regulations require the loss to be reallocated to the partners that
would bear the actual economic loss - here, the LPs. I.R.C. § 704(b); Reg. § 1.704-
1(b)(3)(iii). This reduces the LPs' capital accounts by $20, thereby reducing the
amount of the distribution to which the LPs are entitled (assuming liquidating
distributions are made in accordance with capital accounts). Alternatively, the
distortion described in the text could be conceived of as a "capital shift" for federal
income tax purposes, which would ultimately have a substantially similar tax result.
45. The allocation of the $100 loss entirely to the LPs means that a $20 loss
would be allocated to each LP, reducing each LP's outside basis and capital account
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LPs would receive a total of $1020 from the fund ($520 in Year 2 and $500
in Year 3), i.e., a net of only $20 of profit rather than the $40 to which the
LPs are entitled (80 percent of the $50 net profit). Additionally, the GP
would keep the $30 carry even though the GP's rightful 20 percent carry on
the fund's net profits is only $10.
(2) The Many Problems Presented by Example
#1
Recall that, in the example, the parties agreed that the GP's carry is
to be calculated on an aggregate basis, meaning that, under the foregoing
facts, the GP should only be entitled to a $10 carry. Clearly, the intended
economic deal is distorted if the GP is allowed to keep $30 when the GP has
only "earned" a $10 carry and if the LPs only receive $1020 when they are
"entitled" to $1040.47
In addition, this arrangement provides an incentive to the GP to
strategically time the fund's exit from various investments.48 Specifically, the
GP would be incentivized to cause the fund to exit profitable transactions
(from which the GP receives a carry) prior to unprofitable transactions
(which would reduce the GP's net carry if the exit from the unprofitable
transactions occurred prior to or simultaneously with the exit from profitable
transactions).49
Further, given the option-like nature of the GP's carried interest, the
economic outcome of Example #1 could encourage increased risk-taking by
the GP. Specifically, as commentators have explained, a carried interest,5°
upon grant, is akin to an at-the-money option on a 20 percent interest in the
from $120 to $100. See supra note 43 (explaining that each LP's outside basis and
capital account is $120 prior to the loss allocation); I.R.C. § 705(a)(2)(A); Reg. §
1.704-1(b)(2)(iv)(b)(7).
46. One fifth of this total distribution, $100 (i.e., the amount equal to each
LP's capital account), would be distributed to each LP.
47. When a few more zeros are added to the end of these numbers (which
would be a much better reflection of the magnitude of actual fund investments), the
distortions described herein quickly add up to large sums of money.
48. See also Gilson, Venture Capital Market, supra note 17, at 1089
(explaining the timing incentive created by a carried interest in the absence of a
clawback).
49. This incentive is "particularly acute" if the calculation of the carry,
during the life of the fund, does not take account of unrealized losses. Needham,
Private Equity Funds, supra note 17, at III.B.3.
50. Recall, we are assuming that the GP is entitled to a carry from the first
dollar of profit, and that the entitlement to the carry is not subject to a hurdle rate.
Implicit in this assumption is the assumption that this carry design reflects the
parties' desired economic relationship, so the remainder of the discussion addresses
how that desired economic relationship is altered by various factors.
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fund.51 When the fund earns a profit that would entitle the GP to a carry, the
carried interest becomes an in-the-money option on the entire fund.
However, as soon as any non-forfeitable carry is distributed to the GP, the
carried interest reverts back to (or at least become much closer to) being an
at-the-money option on just the remaining portion of the fund. This "reset"
of the option changes the GP's risk-taking incentives - before the
distribution of any carry, the GP's incentive is to maximize the value of the
entire fund, but after the distribution of a non-forfeitable carry, the GP's
incentive is to maximize the value of the assets remaining in the fund, even if
that does not maximize the value of the entire fund (i.e., taking into account
the portion of the fund that has been distributed). Reputational considerations
and capital contributions by the GP may help to constrain the GP from taking
excessive risk,53 but the option-like nature of the carried interest affects the
GP's risk-taking incentives.
An example helps to illustrate this scenario.
Recall that the LPs in Example #1 contributed $1000 and the fund
used that $1000 to purchase two assets. At this point, the GP's carry is akin
to an at-the-money option on 20 percent of the LPs' interests in the fund -
the carry has zero liquidation value, but it does have upside value if the fund
assets increase in value.
In Year 2, when Asset A (which the fund has not yet sold) is worth
$550 and when the value of Asset B remains at its $600 purchase price, the
GP's carry is in-the-money. That is, the GP's option now has a liquidation
value of $30. 54 But because the GP's economic entitlement still depends on
the performance of the entire fund, the GP's incentive still is to maximize the
51. See Victor Fleischer, The Missing Preferred Return, 31 IOWA J. CORP.
L. 77, 97-108 (2005) (explaining the option analogy) [hereinafter Fleischer,
Preferred Return]; Gilson, Venture Capital Markets, supra note 17, at 1089-90.
52. This also occurs when the assets increase in value, such that they could
generate a profit, ultimately entitling the GP to a carry.
53. Particularly where the GP is a repeat player in a small market, the GP
does have reputation at stake, which could inhibit excess risk-taking even if the carry
is out-of-the-money. See Gilson, Venure Capital Markets, supra note 17, at 1090
(discussing the operation of the "reputation market" as a constraint on risk-taking
behavior); Fleischer, Preferred Return, supra note 51, at 101-02. Additionally, the
larger the GP's capital contribution, the less the carried interest incentivizes the GP
to take excessive risk. See supra note 39.
54. If the value of the assets of the fund has increased by $150, the GP
would be entitled to a 20 percent carry on that profit (20% * $150 = $30).
Alternatively, this could be understood by continuing with the option analogy - if
the GP exercises the option, the GP would be entitled to an interest in the fund worth
$230 (20 percent of the $1150 aggregate value of the fund assets) in exchange for an
exercise price of $200.
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value of entire fund, taking into account the amounts already earned."
Assume that the GP has multiple mutually-exclusive ways that it might
manage Asset B, including an approach that has a 20 percent chance Asset B
will be worth $2000, and an 80 percent chance that Asset B will be worth $0.
This approach has a $400 expected value,56 which is less than the asset's
current $600 value. This action would reduce the expected value of the entire
fund by $200, holding everything else steady. Thus, it is not in the LPs'
interest for the GP to take this action. It is also not in the GP's interest to take
this action because the reduction in the expected value of the entire fund
would also reduce the total expected value of the GP's carry (in this
example, down to $0). 57 That is, with respect to taking this action with Asset
B, the LP's and GP's interests are aligned.
In contrast, assume that the fund distributes the proceeds from the
sale of Asset A in Year 2 and that the GP cannot be required to return the
$30 it receives in this distribution. The GP's economic incentive with respect
to subsequent fund asset management decisions depends not on the
performance of the entire fund in the aggregate, but rather only on the
performance of the fund's remaining asset, Asset B (again, assume that Asset
B is still worth $600). This effectively turns the GP's carry back into an at-
the-money (rather than an in-the-money) option. With this at-the-money
option, the GP now does have an incentive to take the riskier approach to
managing Asset B that is described above.58 This is because, under the
55. To the extent that the GP is risk averse, the in-the-money character of
the carry could actually lead the GP to take too little risk with respect to subsequent
management decisions. That is, the GP might opt for an approach to Asset B that
will, with 100 percent certainty, result in $605, rather than an approach to Asset B
that, while subject to some uncertainty, will have an expected value of $610 (e.g., 50
percent chance of $590, 50 percent chance of $630). However, for simplicity, this
discussion will assume (unless otherwise stated) that the GP is a risk-neutral, rational
actor or that other factors (e.g., fund agreement limitations on the type of
investments the GP may make) constrain any (or most of the) incentive that the GP
has to take too little risk.
56. (20% * $2000) + (80% * $0) = $400
57. Prior to choosing an action with respect to Asset B, the fund assets are
worth $1150 ($550 value of Asset A plus $600 value of Asset B). If the GP opts for
the risky approach to managing Asset B, the expected value of Asset B under this
approach is $400. Thus, holding everything else steady, the expected value of the
total fund assets would be only $950 ($550 value of Asset A + $400 expected value
of Asset B), in which case the GP would not be entitled to any money on account of
the carry; the GP's earlier entitlement to a $30 carry from Asset A would be totally
eliminated.
58. Of course, the GP's choice of action does depend on what other
alternatives are available for managing Asset B. Here, for purposes of simplicity, I
just compare the 20 percent chance of $2000 / 80 percent chance of $0 approach to
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approach described above (20 percent chance of $2000 value, 80 percent of
$0 value), the GP has a 20 percent chance of earning additional carry if the
value of Asset B increases to $2000. If the risk fails, the GP will keep the
$30 carry previously distributed and get nothing more - the same result as if
Asset B merely maintained its current $600 value. Thus, the GP has nothing
to lose (setting aside reputational issues)59 by taking a risk with respect to
asset management decisions of the fund that the LPs would not want to
take.
60
Moreover, this incentive for the GP to take this type of risk (i.e., a
long-shot risk that would reduce the fund's expected value) is increased if
the carry becomes akin to an out-of-the-money option, which will happen as
soon as the value of Asset B declines at all from its original $600 value. And
the risk-taking incentive continues to increase as the GP's carry gets deeper
and deeper out-of-the-money (i.e., if and as the value of Asset B declines
more and more).61
(b) Example #2 - How Might a Clawback Help Protect
the LPs?
Consider again the basic scenario presented by Example #1, but now
assume that the fund agreement contains a complete clawback provision. A
clawback provision corrects the economic distortions encountered in
Example #1. The clawback requires the GP to return the over-distributed
carry (i.e., $20, which is the excess of $30 carry received in Year 2 over the
the status quo, assuming that the asset could maintain its value in the absence of
action.
59. See Gilson, Venture Capital Markets, supra note 17, at 1090 (discussing
reputational considerations); Fleischer, Preferred Return, supra note 51, at 101-02.
60. In general, an option-holder (such as the GP) and an equity-holder (such
as an LP) will have incentives that are somewhat misaligned; generally, an option-
holder, even an in-the-money option-holder, will prefer more risk than an equity-
holder because the option-holder has similar upside potential but less downside
exposure. As the option becomes more and more in-the-money (i.e., more equity-
like), the option-holder's risk preference will generally grow closer and closer to the
equity-holder's risk preferences. Conversely, the more out-of-the-money an option
becomes, the more the option-holder's risk preferences will diverge from the equity-
holder's risk preferences. Given this typical option-holder/equity-holder relationship,
the point of the example in the text is that a fund agreement that provides for a GP
carry without a clawback exacerbates the misalignment of risk-taking preferences.
61. Note that a carry that is out-of-the-money may be useful in helping to
curtail any incentive the GP may have to take too little risk. This concept is built into
fund agreements where the GP is only entitled to a carry after a hurdle rate is




$10 carry to which the GP is rightfully entitled).62 Sometimes, the GP's carry
distribution is placed in an escrow to ensure that the funds will be readily
available to fulfill any clawback obligation.
Once the $20 has been "clawed back" by the fund, the $20 can be
distributed to the LPs. As a result, the GP will have received its rightful 20
percent aggregate carry ($10), and the LPs will have received a return of
their capital contributions ($1000) and their rightful 80 percent share of the
fund's net profit ($40). Thus, the GP and the LPs end up with net
distributions that reflect the economic deal that the parties originally
intended.63
Further, with the clawback, the GP has much less incentive to
strategically time the fund's exit from transactions depending on whether
they are profitable or unprofitable.64 This is because excess carry distributed
62. Technically, the clawback operates as a limited deficit restoration
obligation. Regs. §§ 1.704-l(b)(2)(ii)(c), -l(b)(2)(ii)(d). Thus, when the fund has a
$100 loss in Year 3, $20 of that loss can be allocated to the GP because even though
that would appear to create a deficit in the GP's capital account, the limited DRO
would erase that deficit. As a result, the allocation of the $20 of loss to the GP will
have substantial economic effect, and the GP ends up bearing the economic burden
of that loss. Compare this result to the result, explained supra note 44, in the absence
of a clawback. Again, this transfer of $20 could be conceived of, alternatively, as a
capital shift. Id. However, I think that the allocation concept better reflects the
economic relationship created by the clawback, particularly if and as losses are
harvested after gains but before the liquidation of the fund, and particularly if the
clawback provision language specifically states that the GP fulfills the clawback by
contributing to the fund. See Needham, Private Equity Funds, supra note 17, at
Worksheet 3 (providing sample clawback language that requires the GP to fulfill the
clawback by making a contribution to the fund).
63. Note that the GP should be entitled to a loss when it fulfills its clawback
obligation and/or the fund liquidates. Technically, this can be conceived of as either
(1) an allocation of $20 loss to the GP, which is supported by the limited DRO
reflected in the clawback (possibly at liquidation and particularly if interim
clawbacks are made during the life of the fund), or (2) a recognition of loss upon the
final liquidation of a partnership interest (where the GP contributes the $20, giving
the GP a $20 capital account, but where the $20 is actually distributed to the LPs).
I.R.C. § 704(b) ($20 allocation of loss to the GP); I.R.C. § 73 l(a)(2) (recognition of
loss upon liquidation); see also David J. Schwartz, Raising a Private Equity Fund-
Economic Provisions: Carried Interest, Clawback and Management Fees, 1824
PRACTISING LAW INST. CORP. LAW & PRACTICE COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 97,
102-04 (2010). If the GP can fully use this loss, the loss will offset the excess taxes
previously paid by the GP on the excess carry that was ultimately returned.
64. The GP may have other incentives to time the exit from particular
transactions. For example, accelerating the exit from profitable transactions could
make the fund look quite profitable, which could be useful to the GP if the GP is
trying to raise a second fund during the life of the first fund. Also, the GP may still
have a slight incentive to accelerate the exit from profitable transactions and delay
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in connection with early exit from a profitable transaction must be returned,
in whole or in part, to the fund if later transactions produce losses.
Additionally, while the GP's carried interest is still equivalent to an
option, the addition of the clawback means that the value of the previously
distributed carry must be taken into account when analyzing the GP's
incentives regarding future management decisions.65 That is, immediately
after the distribution of the $30 carry in Year 2, the carry's in-the-money
status remains unchanged. Thus, in the illustration provided above, the GP's
carry turns into an at-the-money option only after the clawback would
consume the entire carry previously distributed to the GP (i.e., until Asset B
declines in value to $450, completely wiping out the fund's profit from Asset
A), and the carry turns into an out-of-the-money option only after the value
of Asset B declines even further. As a result, the addition of the clawback
negates (or at least mitigates) the increased incentive for risk-taking that
arises in the absence of a clawback.
(c) Example #3 - How Do Taxes on the Carry Affect
the Operation of a Clawback?
Clawback provisions are often limited to the amount of the GP's
"after-tax carry. 66 That is, the GP can only be asked to return the amount of
the carry previously received, reduced by the taxes paid (or assumed paid) on
67the GP's carry.
This cap can reduce the beneficial effects of a clawback that were
described in Example #2. Consider again Example #2, where the GP is
entitled to a 20 percent carry (calculated on an aggregate basis), but the carry
is subject to a clawback. Recall that, in Example #2, $30 was allocated and
distributed to GP on account of the carry in Year 2. Assume that, in Year 2,
the exit from unprofitable transactions because the GP could benefit from the time
value of money on the early over-distributions of carry, but this incentive is likely to
be relatively small. See also Gregg D. Polsky, Private Equity Management Fee
Conversion, 122 TAX NOTES 743 (Feb. 9, 2009) (discussing how fee waivers can
create incentives for GPs to time exits from investments).
65. This is because the GP's ability to retain the $30 carry is contingent on
the total performance of the fund.
66. See Needham, Private Equity Funds, supra note 17, at III.B.4; Alan J.
Pomerantz, Example of Distribution/Clawback Provisions, 541 PRACTISING LAW
INST. REAL EST. LAW AND PRACTICE COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 191 (2007)
(providing a very nice example of the operation of a clawback that is capped at the
after-tax carry).
67. This is generally the case even if the GP's carry distributions are
escrowed. Typically, even when there is an escrow of the GP's carry, a portion of the
escrowed funds are distributed out to the GP in an amount sufficient to allow the GP




GP paid (or is assumed to pay) $4.50 of tax on the carry (15 percent tax on
68$30). If the amount of any clawback is capped at the GP's after-tax carry,
the most that could be clawed back from the GP is $25.50 ($30 - $4.50). If
the clawback obligation is $20 (as it was in Example #2), the clawback
works to provide the parties with the economics to which they originally
agreed. The cap presents no problem.
(1) Loss-Shifting
If, however, the fund only earned an aggregate profit of $10 (i.e., the
fund sold Asset B at $460, producing a loss of $140, wiping out all but $10
of the $150 gain from Asset A), the GP would only be entitled to a $2 carry
(20 percent of the $10 aggregate profit). Thus, a full clawback would require
the GP to return $28 (the $30 carry received in Year 2 less the $2 carry to
which the GP is rightfully entitled). But, if the clawback is capped at the
amount of the GP's after-tax carry ($25.50), the GP is not obligated to return
the full $28 of over-distributed carry. Thus, the LPs can only receive a total
distribution from the fund of $1005.50 ($520 distributed in Year 2 + $460
proceeds from the sale of Asset B + $25.50 clawback from the GP), instead
of the $1008 rightfully owed to the LPs ($1000 return of capital + 80 percent
of the $10 net profit). That is, the "after-tax" cap on the GP's clawback
obligation results in the shifting of the economic burden of losses to the
LPs.
69
The maximum amount of losses that can be shifted from the GP to
the LPs as a result of the after-tax cap on the clawback is equal to the tax
paid (or assumed paid) by the GP on the carry. So, in this example, if the
fund had zero aggregate profits and the GP would be entitled to a carry of $0,
the GP would return only $25.50 pursuant to the after-tax clawback (rather
than the full $30 of carry received), thereby shifting a maximum of $4.50 of
economic losses from the GP to the LPs. Note that, because the maximum
amount of economic loss that can be shifted from the GP to the LP is equal
to the product of the applicable tax rate and the amount of the carry allocated
68. Often, the "after-tax" carry is calculated using an assumed rate of tax.
See Needham, Private Equity Funds, supra note 17, at III.B.4. (noting that the
clawback provisions often assume that "the general partner bears tax at the marginal
rates of a NYC resident and has no unrelated losses to shelter fund income").
69. See generally Howard E. Abrams, Taxation of Carried Interests: The
Reform that Did Not Happen, 40 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 197 (2009) (providing a useful
explanation as to why an incomplete clawback can hurt LPs). Cf Burke, Sound and
Fury, supra note 1, at 12-14 (arguing that GPs should not be respected as partners in
funds where incomplete clawbacks shift to the LPs the economic burden of taxes
nominally imposed on the GP).
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to the GP,70 as the early carries increase in size, so too does the potential that
the LPs will bear more than their share of subsequent losses.7'
(2) Increasing the GP's Risk-Taking Incentive
Again, the GP's carried interest remains equivalent to an option, but
any reduction in the maximum amount of the clawback makes the GP's carry
closer and closer to an out-of-the-money option. That is, in Example #3, the
GP's carried interest becomes an out-of-the-money option when the
clawback obligation exceeds $25.50 (i.e., once the value of Asset B declines
by more than $127.50, to below $472.50). If Asset B is declining in value
from $600, it will be worth $472.50 (i.e., the out-of the-money threshold
when the clawback is capped by the after-tax carry) before it is worth $450
(i.e., the out-of-the-money threshold when the clawback can recoup the full
amount of the carry). Thus, a clawback capped at the GP's after-tax carry
will create an incentive for increased risk-taking before a full (uncapped)
clawback will create that incentive.72
2. Appreciating How Clawback Problems Are Exacerbated by
Increases to the Tax on Carried Interests
The loss-shifting and risk-taking incentive effects of capping the
clawback at the GP's after-tax carry increase dramatically as the tax rate
applicable to the GP's carry increases.
Specifically as to the loss-shifting problem, the maximum economic
loss that could be shifted from the GP to the LPs increases in proportion to
the increase in the tax rate applicable to the carry. For example, recall the
earlier examples where the GP received a distribution of a $30 carry in Year
2. If the tax rate applicable to the GP's carry is 40 percent rather than 15
percent, then capping the clawback at the GP's after-tax carry ($30 - 40% =
$18) could shift $12 (rather than $4.50) of economic loss from the GP to the
70. This assumes that the amount of the carry that gets distributed is at least
equal to amount of tax due on the carry that is allocated to the GP.
71. Further, as will be explained later, the potential that the LPs will bear
more than their share of subsequent losses also increases as the tax rate applicable to
the carry increases.
72. Risk-taking is not inherently problematic. The key, of course, is that
parties understand the risks to which they are exposed and that the parties believe
that they are adequately compensated for those risks. Thus, if LPs consent to a
contract that creates a particular level of risk-taking incentive for the GPs and if a
change in the tax law increases that risk-taking incentive, then the LPs become
exposed to a level of risk to which they did not intend to be exposed.
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LPs.73 Said differently, where the tax rate increases by 267 percent (15% -)
40%), the maximum potential economic loss that could be shifted from the
GP to the LPs also increases by 267 percent ($4.50 -' $12). 74
The risk-taking incentive problem is also increasingly problematic as
the tax rate applicable to the carry increases. Again, consider the example
where the GP received a distribution of a $30 carry in Year 2, and where the
clawback is capped at the GP's after-tax carry. If the tax rate applicable to
the GP's carry is 40 percent, the GP's clawback exposure is only $18. As a
result, the GP's carry becomes an out-of-the-money option when the
clawback obligation exceeds $18 (i.e., when the value of Asset B declines by
more than $90, to below $510). Recall that, when the carry was taxed at 15
percent, the GP's carry only became an out-of-the-money option when the
value of Asset B dropped below $472.50. A comparison of these two
scenarios illustrates that, if clawbacks are capped at the GP's after-tax carry,
the carry subject to tax at 40 percent will create a stronger incentive for risk-
taking than a carry subject to tax at 15 percent. Thus, if a clawback
obligation is capped by the GP's after-tax carry, as the tax rate applicable to
the GP's carry increases, the GP becomes increasingly likely to have an
incentive for risk-taking that could inure to the detriment of the LPs.
Because GPs are often repeat players in the fund business, it is
possible that the reputational markets could dampen the GP's risk-taking
incentive.75 If, however, the value of the fund assets decline enough to turn
the GP's carry into an out-of-the-money option, the fund is likely already
having trouble (although, the higher the tax rates on the carry, the less
trouble the fund needs to be in before the carry turns into an out-of-the-
money option). Troubled fund performance, by itself, creates adverse
reputational consequences. Thus, query to what extent the possibility of
additional market sanctions is likely to affect the GP's risk-taking choices.
73. These numbers could be larger if early transactions produced larger
profits because of an increase in the tax paid (or assumed paid) on those profits. This
increases the amount of the distributed carry that could not be recouped under the
clawback, and thus increases the amount of losses that could be shifted to the LPs.
74. Again, when dealing with dollar numbers that are more realistic (e.g.,
four or five orders of magnitude larger), the effects described herein could lead to
significant economic losses for LPs.
75. See Gilson, Venture Capital Market, supra note 17, at 1090 (discussing
the operation of the "reputation market" as a constraint on risk-taking behavior);
Fleischer, Preferred Return, supra note 51, at 101-02. As mentioned earlier, capital
contributions made by the GP can also serve as a check on GP risk-taking behavior.
See supra note 39.
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3. Recommendations for Fund Investors Regarding Clawbacks
Increased loss-shifting seems likely to be more problematic for LPs
than increased risk-taking,16 and each concern will be more problematic for
some LPs and less problematic for others. Ultimately, the degree of concern
depends on a wide variety of factors including the fund's distribution scheme
(including the timing of the distribution of the carry), the expected timing of
the fund's exits from various investments, the expected volatility of the fund,
the LPs' risk preferences, and the strength of the reputational and other
contractual constraints on the GP's behavior. For funds in which the LPs are
concerned about the potential loss-shifting and/or risk-taking issues that arise
from an increase in the tax rate on the GP's carried interest, the LPs can try
to mitigate these issues by negotiating about the terms of the carry and the
clawback. Several potential approaches are available.
(a) Revise How the Carry is Calculated
One way for LPs to respond to the potential consequences of higher
taxes on carried interests is to negotiate about how the GP's carry is
calculated during the life of the fund. The objective of this negotiation should
be to make the interim carry calculations as reflective of the funds' true net
peformance as possible, thereby reducing the likelihood that the GP receives
an over-allocation and over-distribution of carry.
For example, assuming that the economic deal between the parties is
that the GP's carry should be 20 percent of the aggregate profits of the fund
over the fund's entire lifetime, the GP's carry for any particular period could
be calculated on a cumulative basis (rather than on a deal-by-deal or year-by-
year basis), taking into account at least some prior year losses (if there are
any). Further, the GP's carry for any particular period could take into
account not only that period's realized gains and losses, but also any
unrealized losses. Many funds already take one or both of these
approaches.
77
Both of these alternatives could reduce the GP's current allocations
on account of the carry, thereby reducing the likelihood of an over-
distribution of carry that would trigger a clawback. Reducing the GP's
current allocations on account of the carry would also reduce the amount of
tax paid (or assumed paid) on the carry, thus reducing the impact of any
after-tax cap on a clawback obligation. Ultimately, the more closely interim
76. This is because the latter is a shift in pre-existing behavioral incentives
for risk-taking, on which there are external constraints (like reputation); the behavior
may or may not change. In contrast, the adverse consequences of increased loss-
shifting do not depend on the rationality of economic actors and are not subject to
similar external constraints.
77. Breslow, Selected Excerpts, supra note 17, at § 2.8.1
2012]
Florida Tax Review
distributions of carry reflect the GP's aggregate carry entitlement, the less
likely a clawback will be needed, and the less impact the after-tax cap on the
clawback is likely to have.
Of course, revising the method for calculating the carry in a way that
would reduce the GP's current allocations and distributions of carry might be
highly undesirable to the GP. While these changes should not ultimately
change the amount of the aggregate carry to which the GP is entitled, these
changes may defer the GP's receipt of some portion of the carry, thereby
subjecting the GP to a non-trivial time-value-of-money cost.
(b) Change the Tax Rate Used for Calculating the
"After-Tax" Carry
Whether the method for calculating the carry is revised, LPs could
negotiate with the GP about the tax rate that is used for calculating the "after-
tax" carry. Typically, fund agreements use either a particular rate that is
stated in the agreement (such as 15 percent) or a rate that is determinable for
a hypothetical taxpayer under a set of assumptions that are articulated in the
fund agreement.
Where the cap on the clawback is calculated using a stated tax rate,
the LPs may consider whether they are willing to agree to increase that stated
rate to one that is higher than today's tax rates but lower than the tax rate that
the carried interest tax proposals would impose on the GP's carry. For
example, imagine a fund with a clawback that is capped at the GP's after-tax
carry, using a stated tax rate of 15 percent. If the carried interest legislation
passes, the GP will likely want the cap on the clawback to be calculated
using a stated tax rate of 40 percent. 8 Instead, the parties could negotiate to
use a stated tax rate between 15 percent and 40 percent (say, a compromise
rate of 27.5 percent, to split the difference).
Similarly, where the cap on the clawback is calculated at a tax rate
determined based on a variety of assumptions, the LPs could negotiate about
the assumptions on which the amount of the after-tax carry is calculated.
Those assumptions include assumptions regarding the rate of tax, regarding
the location of the "hypothetical" taxpayer whose tax rate is used for
calculating the after tax carry, and/or regarding the availability of losses to
offset income from the carry. Where the after-tax cap on the clawback is
determined based on a variety of assumptions, it is likely that an increase in
the tax rate applicable to carried interest will automatically be incorporated
into the "after-tax" determination, without any action or agreement by the
78. Where an existing fund agreement uses a "stated rate" for calculating
the after-tax cap on the clawback, the GP is likely to approach the LPs in an effort to
modify the agreement. The bargaining dynamic is likely reversed if the after-tax cap
on the clawback is calculated at a rate determined based on a variety of assumptions.
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LPs. Thus, if the LPs want to avoid the loss-shifting and risk-taking
consequences described herein, the LPs will likely need to approach the GP
in an effort to modify an existing agreement.
Ultimately, if tax rates on carried interests increase, LPs may be
willing to increase, at least to some degree, the tax rate (stated or assumed)
used to determine the cap on the clawback. The lower the tax rate used for
purposes of calculating the after-tax carry, the more complete the clawback.7 9
Under a compromise agreement, the LPs likely would be agreeing to some
increase in potential loss-shifting and likelihood of increased risk-taking, but
the LPs may be able to limit their exposure to some degree.
(c) Take the GP's Tax Loss into Account when
Calculating the "After- Tax" Carry
Another alternative is to include an additional, but typically ignored,
factor into the calculation of the cap on the clawback - the value of the tax
loss that the GP will have as a result of forfeiting some or all of its
previously taxed carry.80 Calculations of the after-tax cap on the clawback
typically ignore this factor, using the assumption that the GP does not have
any capital gains against which the loss could be used.81 This assumption is
79. A more complete clawback is equivalent to an increase in the size of the
GP's limited deficit restoration obligation. See supra note 62. Alternatively, rather
than arguing about the details of the clawback, the LPs could ask the GP to commit
to an explicit limited deficit restoration obligation separate and apart from any
clawback. Where the GP is committed to a limited DRO, losses (in an amount up to
the limited DRO) can be allocated to the GP, even if the allocation to the GP of those
losses would otherwise create a deficit in the GP's capital account. As a result, the
limited DRO would limit the possibility of loss shifting and would delay the GP's
incentive for increased risk taking. From a partnership tax perspective, the addition
of a limited DRO would have a very similar economic impact as an increase to the
size of the clawback obligation (or elimination/reduction of the after-tax cap on the
clawback obligation). A limited DRO, however, could present as a different business
issue than a clawback primarily because (1) a clawback is a limited DRO that is
specifically tied to over-distributions of carry, whereas a more general limited DRO
could be triggered in a wider variety of circumstances, and (2) a limited DRO may
be located in a different part of the fund agreement than a clawback. I suspect that
GPs are likely to resist this approach for the same reasons that GPs typically resist
any DRO - they do not want to increase their downside economic exposure,
particularly since this could increase the GP's exposure to claims from the fund's
creditors. Nevertheless, this may be an option for LPs who are particularly
concerned about loss-shifting.
80. See supra note 44 (explaining why a fulfillment of a clawback results in
a tax loss for the GP).
81. Individuals cannot carry capital losses back to offset previously
included capital gains, so use of the capital loss depends on whether the individual
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quite likely incorrect in most cases. So, the calculation of the cap on the
clawback would better reflect the true economics if the GP's clawback
obligation is not only reduced by the full amount of the assumed tax bill on
the carry, but is also increased by the value of the tax loss that arises when
the GP pays the clawback. However, the inclusion of this additional factor is
"often resisted by general partners because it involves an analysis of personal
tax returns" (i.e., to determine the extent to which the GP is able to use the
loss).82
Nevertheless, if the tax rate on the carry increases (thereby reducing
the size of the after-tax clawback, and increasing the loss-shifting and risk-
taking problems described earlier), LPs may feel more strongly about using a
more economically accurate formula for calculating the cap on the clawback.
In turn, the LPs may be able to put more and more pressure on the GP to
agree that the clawback amount - the GP's after-tax carry - should take
into account the value of the GP's tax loss resulting from the clawback. The
"personally intrusive, 83 nature of the determination of the value of this tax
benefit can be mitigated by either (1) using an assumed rate of tax benefit
84
(which need not assume full usability of the loss) or (2) by using the GP's
good faith estimate of the value of the tax benefit.
Moreover, the enactment of the carried interest tax proposals
actually increases the likelihood that the loss arising from a clawback
payment will largely or fully compensate the GP for excess taxes paid on the
carry. Given that the carried interest tax proposals would tax (some or all of)
the carry at ordinary income rates, the GP's tax loss upon fulfilling a
clawback obligation is arguably characterized as an ordinary loss rather than
a capital loss. 85 Since ordinary losses are not subject to limitations on use to
has capital gains from another source during the year of the loss or in subsequent
years. I.R.C. § 1211.
82. Breslow, Selected Excerpts, supra note 17, at § 2.8.1 [G][4]; see also
Needham, Private Equity Funds, supra note 17, at III.B.4. ("Fund investors usually
accept the possibility of a windfall to the general partner [that arises from ignoring
the potential tax benefit to the general partner as a result of the clawback], perhaps in
the belief that the general partner will earn positive returns on invested capital.").
83. Breslow, Selected Excerpts, supra note 17.
84. An assumed rate for calculating the GP's tax liability on the carry and
an assumed rate for calculating the GP's tax benefit from the clawback can be
simplified, on net, to a single assumed rate. For example, assuming a 40 percent tax
rate on the carry and a 10 percent tax benefit on the clawback (discounted perhaps to
reflect the GP's ability to use the benefit), could net out to an assumed 30 percent
rate of tax for calculating the clawback cap (i.e., the amount of the GP's net after-tax
carry).
85. I.R.C. § 165(c)(1). The availability of an ordinary deduction when the
GP fulfills its clawback obligation is suggested by the tax benefit rule. There is some
risk that the loss could still be characterized as LTCL even if the income was taxed
as ordinary income. This is because repayment of the clawback obligation could be
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which capital losses are subject, the LPs can argue that the calculation of the
after-tax carry ought to assume full usability of any losses arising from the
clawback obligation. Under this assumption, the GP's argument against
taking the value of the tax loss into account is significantly weakened
(almost made meritless) because valuation of the loss would no longer
require "an analysis of personal tax returns." In turn, the LPs' argument that
the value of the tax loss should be taken into account when determining the
GP's clawback obligation (i.e., the after-tax carry) is significantly
strengthened. That is, if the GP's tax loss is ordinary and fully usable, the GP
is quite likely to be able to recover any excess tax paid on the portion of the
carry that the GP ultimately had to return.
This is particularly true given that the "make whole" rule of section
1341 arguably (but not certainly) applies to the GP's loss,8 6 which would
considered to be a capital contribution that generates basis in the partnership interest.
Then, when the GP does not receive that money back in the liquidation of the
partnership, the GP may be viewed as recognizing a loss arising from the liquidation
of the partnership, which is generally treated as a capital loss. I.R.C. § 73 1(a)(2)
(flush language).
86. I.R.C. § 1341. Section 1341 applies if three requirements are met. First,
the taxpayer must have included an amount in income for a prior taxable year
because it appeared that the taxpayer had a right to the income. Id. at § 1341(a)(1).
Carry distributions are made to GPs on the basis that GPs are entitled to that money;
however, given the contingent clawback obligation, the GP's entitlement to the carry
distribution is arguably "apparent" and not certain. That said, there is some risk that
the carry could be conceived of as an unchallengeable right to funds, which is
undermined by the subsequent facts that trigger the clawback obligation. The
difference between an "apparent right" to funds (that triggers section 1341) and an
"unchallengeable right undermined by subsequent facts" (to which section 1341 does
not apply) is slight, but it is critical for purposes of determining whether a taxpayer
will benefit from the "make whole" provision of Section 1341. See BORIS I.
BITTKER, MARTIN J. MCMAHON, JR. & LAWRENCE A. ZELENAK, FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION OF INDIVIDUALS 4.03 [4], n.49 (2d ed. 2011) (citing cases) [hereinafter,
BITTKER, MCMAHON & ZELENAK, TAXATION]. Second, for section 1341 to apply, "a
deduction [must be] allowable for the taxable year because it was established after
the close of such prior taxable year (or years) that the taxpayer did not have an
unrestricted right to such item or to a portion of such item." I.R.C. § 1341(a)(2). A
clawback obligation is triggered when it is determined that the GP did not, in fact,
have an unrestricted right to the previously distributed carry, and the clawback
obligation produces a tax loss allowable under section 165. Third, the deduction
must exceed $3000, and for purposes of this analysis, I assume that this threshold is
satisfied. Id. at §1341(a)(3). See also generally BITTKER, MCMAHON & ZELENAK,
TAXATION, supra at 4.03[4] (discussing the application of section 1341 to
situations where taxpayer repays amounts received under claim of right); Matthew
A. Melone, Adding Insult to Injury: The Federal Income Tax Consequences of the
Clawback of Executive Compensation, 25 AKRON TAX J. 55, 84-95 (2010); Rosina
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ensure that the GP's tax liability for the year of the clawback is reduced by at
least the tax previously paid on the clawback amount,87 thereby fully
reimbursing the GP (setting aside the time value of money) for the excess
taxes paid. Thus, if the tax loss will effectively refund to the GP all excess
taxes paid on the portion of the carry that the GP ultimately had to return
(setting aside the time value of money), the LPs have a very strong argument
that the clawback obligation should be limited only to the pre-tax, and not
after-tax, carry."
(d) Restructure the Carry as a Contingent Fee
To the extent that the parties want greater certainty that, upon a
forfeiture of amounts previously received, the GP will benefit from a
reduction in tax liability at least equal to the tax previously paid on the
amount forfeited, the parties could restructure the carry into an economic
relationship to which section 1341 more clearly applies. For example, rather
than structuring the GP's entitlement to 20 percent of profits as a profits
interest in a partnership, the GP's entitlement to 20 percent of profits could
be structured as a "contingent fee" equal to 20 percent of the total profits.89 A
contingent fee for services is a classic arrangement to which section 1341
applies.90 A contingent fee could provide economics that are substantially
similar to a carried interest, in that both can entitle the recipient to 20 percent
of the profits earned by the enterprise.
Of course, a key difference under the existing tax law is that a
contingent fee is taxed as ordinary income, 91 whereas the character of income
received on account of a carry can be capital gain or ordinary income
B. Barker and Kevin P. O'Brien, Taxing Clawbacks: Theory and Practice, 129 TAX
NOTES 423, 425-435 (Oct. 25, 2010).
87. I.R.C. § 1341(a)(4), (5).
88. Where the value of a subsequent loss upon payment of a clawback is at
least equal to the tax originally paid on the amount clawed-back, a clawback cap that
takes into account the value of the tax loss when determining the GP's after-tax carry
is equivalent to a clawback of the entire carry, unreduced by taxes. Again, an
increase to size of the clawback is tantamount to an increase the GP's limited deficit
restoration obligation, thereby reducing loss-shifting potential and delaying the
incentive for increased risk taking. See supra notes 62, 79, and associated text.
89. My thanks to Gregg Polsky for this idea.
90. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 72-78, 1972-1 C.B. 45 (applying section 1341 to a
contingent commission arrangement). Where the retention of a fee is contingent on
the occurrence (or nonoccurrence) of subsequent events, the recipient has an
apparent right to the funds, but the right to the funds is clearly challengeable. Thus, a
contingent fee quite likely satisfies the first prong of Section 1341. See supra note
86.
91. I.R.C. § 61.
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depending on the character of the partnership's profits.92 This tax difference
is quite meaningful today given that long term capital gains are generally
taxed at 15 percent, whereas the highest marginal rate applicable to ordinary
income is 35 percent.93 If, however, the tax treatment of carried interests
changes and income earned on account of a carry is taxed as ordinary
income, the tax rate difference between a carry and a contingent fee is
largely eliminated.94 In the absence of the tax rate benefit for carried
interests, parties may opt to restructure their arrangement to create similar
economics while providing greater certainty that the GP would be made
whole if the GP is ultimately obligated to return part of the profits previously
transferred to the GP.
(e) Conclusion Regarding the LPs' Response to the
Clawback Issue
Ultimately, the LPs must determine how much potential loss-shifting
they are willing to bear and how willing they are to accept the possibility of
increased risk-taking by the GP. This determination is relevant both for
investors in newly formed funds and investors in existing funds, although the
negotiating dynamics differ. Investors in new funds can negotiate about these
issues as part of the initial negotiation about the fund agreement provisions.
Investors in existing funds, however, must negotiate against the backdrop of
existing fund agreements, 95 the economic impacts of which can be altered by
the change in the tax law without any corresponding change in the
compensation paid between the parties.
Either way, if the LPs (and their lawyers) appreciate how increases
to the tax rate on the GP's carry can reduce the clawback, and how a
reduction in the clawback poses economic risk to the LPs, the LPs can make
informed decisions about whether and to what extent to negotiate for
compensation for these risks, to negotiate to change the terms of the
clawback to reduce these risks, to negotiate for other contractual protections
against these risks, or to take other action.
92. I.R.C. § 702.
93. I.R.C. § 1.
94. There may still be employment tax differences depending on the details
of the carried interest tax proposal. See supra note 16.
95. In existing funds where the cap on the clawback is pegged to an
assumed tax rate, LPs might be approached by GPs who wish to renegotiate the cap
on the clawback. In other existing funds, the LPs might have to initiate the
negotiation with the GP because the cap on the clawback might automatically
change with any change to the tax rates applicable to carried interests (e.g., if the cap
is pegged to the "applicable" tax rate or if the cap is determined in the good faith
discretion of the GP).
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B. Tax Distribution Provisions
An increase in the tax rate applicable to carried interests can change
how LPs are affected not only by clawback provisions, but also by tax
distribution provisions. Again, the impact on LPs is indirect. And while the
issues raised for LPs as a result of the tax distribution provisions are likely
less troublesome than the issues raised as a result of the clawback provisions,
LPs should still be sensitive to their potential exposure.
This section explains how tax distributions operate and why they are
needed. Then, with this background, this section discusses the possibility that
tax distributions will increase if the tax on carried interests increases, and
explains how LPs may be indirectly affected as a result. Finally, this section
provides some guidance to LPs who are concerned about how they might be
affected by the interaction between the tax distribution provision and the
increase in taxes on carried interests.
1. Understanding Tax Distributions
Under the partnership tax rules, when a partnership earns income,
the partnership itself is not taxed.96 Rather, the partnership's income is
allocated to the partners in accordance with the partnership agreement, and
each partner pays tax on its allocable share of the partnership income.97 This
is true whether or not the partnership distributes cash to the partner.
Thus, when a fund earns income, that income is allocated to the
partners in accordance with the fund agreement, and those partners pay tax
on that income. If at least a significant portion of that income is concurrently
distributed to the partners, the partners can use that cash to pay the tax due.
However, where a fund does not make a corresponding distribution of cash
from the fund, partners have "phantom income" - the partner may owe
current income tax on income that the partner has not yet received.98 Some
partners have no problem with this result because, for example, they have
ample cash flow from other sources, or they are tax-exempt. Many partners,
however, find this "tax without cash" situation to be quite undesirable. In
response, funds often provide for "tax distributions," particularly to the GP.99
Specifically, distributions are made to designated partners in an amount
96. I.R.C. § 702.
97. I.R.C. §§ 702, 704.
98. Funds vary as to whether they generally distribute income as it is
earned, so this "phantom income" issue is more of a problem for partners in some
funds and is less of a problem in other funds. In particular, private equity funds (as
opposed to hedge funds) commonly distribute proceeds quickly upon realization,
reducing the prevalence of phantom income problems in these funds.
99. See Needham, Private Equity Funds, supra note 17, at III.B.5.; LEVIN,
VENTURE CAPITAL, supra note 14, at 1003.5.
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intended to enable a partner to pay tax on the income allocated to that
partner. These distributions typically have priority over other distributions in
the regular distribution waterfall, and these distributions are typically treated
as advances on distributions to which the particular partner would otherwise
be entitled.' 00
Again, some of the details of tax distributions vary from fund to
fund. For example, (i) tax distributions may be made to all partners or only to
the GP,'01 (ii) tax distributions may be calculated using an assumed rate of
tax or using an approach that is more tailored to the individual tax situations
of the particular distributees, 10 2 (iii) tax distributions may be calculated on a
year-by-year basis, deal-by-deal basis, or on a cumulative basis,'0 3 and (iv)
cash remaining after the tax distributions have been made may be retained
and redeployed in the enterprise, or remaining cash may be distributed to the
LPs to return their capital contributions.0 4
Of course, funds that make current cash distributions in amounts
equal to current allocations of income need not provide for tax distributions;
partners in these funds receive plenty of cash to pay the tax on the fund
income allocated to them. That said, to the extent that the fund regularly
makes additional capital calls and the GP (and possibly others) reinvest the
amount received in the distribution less the tax due (or assumed due), the
fund effectively makes "tax distributions." Further, funds that subject the
GP's carry distribution to an escrow also often make tax distributions out of
the escrow to enable the GP to pay taxes on the escrowed funds.1
0 5
Ultimately, where there are delays between the time a partner is
taxed on fund income and the time a partner is to receive that income, a tax
distribution helps the partner overcome the cash flow issue and pay the tax
due on the partner's allocable share of fund income.
100. See Needham, Private Equity Funds, supra note 17, at III.B.5.
101. For example, LPs who are tax-exempt, foreign, or quite liquid may not
need tax distributions.
102. It is much more common to use an assumed rate. See Needham,
Private Equity Funds, supra note 17, at III.B.5.
103. See Needham, Private Equity Funds, supra note 17, at III.B.5.
(explaining that "[t]he effect of a cumulative approach is that gains in any particular
year must exceed the excess of losses over gains in all preceding years before a
member is entitled to a tax distribution").
104. See LEVIN, VENTURE CAPITAL, supra note 14, at 1005 (explaining
that it is a business decision as to whether the GP has the power to reinvest proceeds
rather than to distribute the proceeds); Needham & Brause, Hedge Funds, supra note
11, at I.A. (explaining that hedge funds often have tremendous flexibility to "buy,
sell and reinvest proceeds of sale").
105. See supra note 67.
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2. Increasing Tax Distributions in Response to Increased Tax
on Carried Interests
In funds that earn significant amounts of LTCG income, the carried
interest tax proposals would increase the amount of tax that the GP would
owe on the carried interest. In turn, this could affect tax distributions.
Specifically, GPs would want the size of the tax distributions to be increased
in order to cover the higher tax bill applicable to the carry.
An increase to the amount of the tax distribution may already be
built into some fund agreements such that the tax distributions will increase
in amount without any additional negotiation or agreement between the
parties. This is likely the case where the tax distribution amounts are based
on a variety of assumptions.0 6 For example, consider a fund agreement that
defines the tax distribution to be the amount "reasonably required by the
[GP] for payment of its federal, state, and local estimated (or other) taxes...
relating to the [GP's] distributive share of the income of the [fund]."'0 7 This
language is broad enough to allow for the tax distributions to increase if the
taxes on the carried interest increase; this can occur without any change to
the terms of the fund agreement.
For funds that provide tax distributions, but do so at a stated rate
(such as 15 percent), GPs would likely request an increase in the amount of
the tax distribution to help cover the increased tax cost that the GP would
have to bear.108 And, for funds that do not provide tax distributions but
whose terms result in phantom income, an increase in the tax rate applicable
to the carry would increase a GP's incentive to push for adding tax
distributions to the fund agreement.
A GP may be able to make a relatively sympathetic case for
increasing the tax distribution to the GP if the tax on carried interests
increases. In particular, the GP could explain that tax distributions are merely
advances on amounts that would eventually be distributed to the GP, so the
GP will not end up with any more total money as compared to what the GP
would receive if the tax distribution is not increased. And, although an
increase in the tax distribution results in an earlier distribution of some funds
to the GP, it is the federal government, and not the GP itself, that ultimately
106. Recall that a similar approach is often used for purposes of estimating
a GP's "after-tax carry" that may be subject to a clawback. See supra Part III.A.3.b.
107. Nowak, Hedge Fund Agreement, supra note 18, at 7.10(a); see also
Needham, Private Equity Funds, supra note 17, at Worksheet 5 (providing sample
tax distribution language that is similarly tied to the relevant prevailing tax rates,
rather than to an explicitly stated rate).
108. I have spoken with a handful of fund managers who indicated that this
is how they are likely to respond if the carried interest tax legislation passes. Of
course, this is anecdotal, but it seems like the logical move. I would likely
recommend this course of action if I represented a GP.
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has use of the increased amounts. That is, a GP would argue that the
increased tax distribution does not really help the GP (other than to alleviate
cash flow problems associated with the GP's increased tax bill) because the
GP cannot use that money in order to make other investments. On its face,
this might seem like a reasonably compelling argument for increasing the
GP's tax distribution, but the LPs should be careful.
3. Sensitizing LPs to the Secondary Effects of Increasing the
GP's Tax Distribution
LPs should appreciate the subtle ways in which an increase to the tax
distribution to the GP could affect the remainder of the economic
relationship between the GP and the LPs, including the extent to which the
alignment of the GP's and LPs' incentives is altered.
(a) Eroding the Alignment of Incentives
Carried interests, as currently designed, generally are regarded as
quite effective at aligning the incentives of the GP with the incentives of the
LPs. 10 9 This is because the GP's return is directly proportional to the return
that the fund assets produce for the LPs. The alignment of incentives largely
avoids the potential agency costs that could be created when the fund
investors allocate managerial authority over the fund assets to the GP. The
alignment of interests is not perfect, and there are some minor agency
problems," ° though other features of the carry and the fund help to mitigate
those costs, leaving the interests of the GP and the LPs largely aligned.'11 As
discussed in Part I.A., one of the problems created pursuant to the clawback
provision is the erosion of the alignment of incentives, particularly with
respect to the incentive for risk-taking.
Tax distribution provisions can also erode the alignment of
incentives, though in different respects. Specifically, funds that generally
limit yearly distributions to tax distributions will have increased liquidity
needs if the size of tax distributions to the GP is increased. These increased
liquidity needs can cause the GP's interests in deal harvesting to diverge
from the LPs' interests. This is because, under current law, both the GP and
109. Gilson, Venture Capital Market, supra note 17; Fleischer, Preferred
Return, supra note 51; Robert C. Illig, The Promise of Hedge Fund Governance:
How Incentive Compensation Can Enhance Institutional Investor Monitoring, 60
ALA. L. REV. 41 (2008), [hereinafter Illig, Hedge Fund Governance]; Matthew A.
Melone, Success Breeds Discontent Reforming the Taxation of Carried Interests-
Forcing a Square Peg into a Round Hole, 46 DUQ. L. REV. 421 (2008).
110. See supra note 60.
111. Gilson, Venture Capital Market, supra note 17; Illig, Hedge Fund
Governance, supra note 109.
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the LPs are subject to tax on their fund income at the same rates (LTCG),
assuming that the LPs are also taxable U.S. persons. 1 2 A large portion of
LPs are tax-indifferent, 1 3 but when GPs and LPs are subject to tax at the
same rate, the GP and the LPs are likely to have similar interests in receiving
tax distributions (i.e., both would likely want tax distributions of 15 percent
of the allocated income). In contrast, under the carried interest legislation,
the GP's income from the fund is recharacterized as ordinary income,
increasing the GP's tax liability, but the tax rate on the LPs' income from the
fund remains unaffected. Thus, if taxes are increased on carried interests, a
GP's interest in increasing the tax distribution would be much stronger than
the LPs' interests in doing so. As a result, it is likely that it would be
primarily the GP, and not the LPs, that has an interest in ensuring that the
fund has additional cash flow.1
4
Where the GP's desire for liquidity exceeds the LPs' desire for
liquidity, the GP has an incentive to manage the fund's assets in a way that
will ensure cash flow that is sufficient to cover the GP's larger tax bill, even
if such management is not in the best interests of the LPs. This pressure may
have little, if any, effect in situations where a fund exits a particular
investment in exchange for cash, and all of that cash is made available for
distribution. However, consider the situation where the fund has a limited
amount of cash available for distribution, for example, because a taxable
transaction yielded non-cash proceeds" 5 or because cash proceeds from a
transaction are needed to pay fund expenses. In these types of situations, as
the size of the GP's needed tax distribution increases, the GP may become
increasingly inclined to cause the fund to exit another investment
prematurely in order to ensure that the fund has sufficient cash to cover the
GP's tax needs. Further, where the fund has limited cash flow, the GP, as its
112. This assumes that the LPs are also taxable U.S. persons. This may or
may not be the case. To the extent that the LPs are subject to lower tax rates, the
GP's and LPs' preferences regarding tax distributions are already misaligned. Thus,
if the tax on the GP's carry is increased, and the size of the tax distribution to the GP
is correspondingly increased, then the alignment between the GP's and LPs'
preferences is made even worse. That is, the GP's interest and the LPs' interests are
misaligned when the GP is subject to tax at 15 percent and the LPs are subject to tax
at 0 percent. But, the misalignment of interests is even worse when the GP is subject
to tax at 40 percent and the LPs are subject to tax at 0 percent.
113. See supra note 7.
114. It is possible that, when the GP's tax distribution is increased, the LPs'
tax distributions are also increased proportionately. Then, the LPs would have some
increased interest in increased liquidity. But, even then, the LPs' desire for fund
liquidity would be less than the GP's interest because the GP actually needs the
money to satisfy a current liability to the government, whereas the LPs do not.
115. See generally Needham, Private Equity Funds, supra note 17, at III.C.
(raising this possibility).
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tax bill increases, may be increasingly disinclined to cause the fund to
undertake efficient taxable transactions just because they yield non-cash
proceeds.'i
6
(b) Altering Additional Aspects of the GP's/LPs'
Economic Relationship
An increase in the size of the tax distribution to the GP can cause
other changes to the economic relationship between the GP and the LPs.
These changes may be slight, but they remain worthy of mention because of
how carefully the partners typically negotiate the economic relationship
between the GP and the LPs. The specific manner of change depends, in part,
on the remainder of the fund's scheme for operating distributions.
117
(1) Delaying the Return of Capital to the LPs
Consider a fund agreement that provides for tax distributions to the
GP, followed by a distribution of remaining available cash to the LPs as a
return of the LPs' capital contributions."18 Under this distribution scheme, an
increase in the size of the tax distribution to the GP will reduce the amount of
the current distribution to the LPs, thereby delaying the time at which the
LPs receive a return of their capital contributions. This time value of money
issue may or may not be problematic for the LPs, depending on the LPs'
expectations and needs regarding the rate at which their capital contributions
are returned to them and depending on the magnitude of the increase in the
amount of tax distributions.
(2) Foregoing the Opportunity for the Fund to
Reinvest the Increased Amounts Distributed
as Tax Distributions
Consider a different fund agreement that provides for tax
distributions to the GP and the LPs, with remaining cash available retained
by the fund. An increase in the tax distributions to the GP (whether or not
accompanied by a proportionate increase to the tax distributions made to the
LPs) will reduce the total amount of money available with which the fund
116. This incentive actually exists as a result of the mere increase in taxes
on the carried interest, whether or not the tax increase is accompanied by an increase
in the tax distribution.
117. See generally Needham, Private Equity Funds, supra note 17, at III.B.
(describing various distribution schemes); LEVIN, VENTURE CAPITAL, supra note 14,
at 1003 (same).




can make additional investments. Of course, the tax distribution is merely an
advance distribution of amounts to which the distributee will be ultimately
entitled. However, the earlier this advance is distributed (the larger the tax
distribution, the more money advanced earlier), the less time that money is in
the fund, and the less time the fund will be able to earn returns by investing
that money.
Again, this may or may not be problematic for the LPs, depending in
part on the extent to which the fund's business model depends on retention
and redeployment of the fund's capital over a particular term, and depending
on the magnitude of the increase in the tax distributions.
4. Recommendations for Fund Investors Regarding Tax
Distributions
The existence and magnitude of the foregoing concerns will, of
course, vary from fund to fund and LP to LP. LPs should evaluate their
particular situation to determine the extent to which these concerns are
problematic for them. For example - Does the fund have significant
liquidity constraints? When do the LPs expect to receive returns of their
invested capital? How important is it to the fund's business model to retain
and redeploy as much cash as possible?
The answers to these and other questions should inform both the
LPs' assessments about the degree of any problems created by increased tax
distributions and the LPs' response thereto. LPs may determine that the
issues described in Part III.B.3 are not problematic, and do nothing. Or, LPs
may determine that the issues are somewhat problematic but the LPs may
accept these consequences because the LPs believe that the costs of
accepting the risks are less than the costs of fighting with the GP about the
tax distribution terms. Alternatively, LPs may determine that the problems
created for them by increased tax distributions are sufficiently troublesome
to justify their efforts to protect themselves from the potential adverse impact
of increased tax distributions.
If the LPs want to negotiate with the GPs in an effort to minimize the
consequences described in this part, there are different approaches available.
One approach is to negotiate directly about the terms of the tax distributions
in an effort to change the assumptions on which the amount of the tax
distributions is calculated. Those assumptions include assumptions regarding
the rate of tax, regarding the location of the "hypothetical" taxpayer whose
tax rate is used for calculating the tax distributions, and/or regarding the
availability of losses to offset income from the carry. This is similar to the
approach described above in Part III.A.3.b as a potential response to the
clawback issues.
Another approach is to negotiate about how the GP's carry is
calculated, thereby negotiating indirectly about the amount of the tax
[Vol 13:1
"Carried Interest" Tax Proposals
distribution. For example, calculating the carry on a cumulative basis (rather
than on a year-by-year basis) or calculating the carry net of unrealized losses
could reduce the current allocations of carry, 19 thereby reducing the
necessary tax distributions, thereby reducing the risks described in this part.
This is similar to the approach described above in Part III.A.3 .a as a potential
response to the clawback issues.120
Ultimately, the LPs' response, if any, will depend on the particular
facts and circumstances, but hopefully, this discussion enables the LPs (and
their lawyers) to evaluate the magnitude of any potential concern created by
increased tax distributions.
IV. CONCLUSION
The debate about the taxation of carried interests continues, raising a
real possibility of an increase in the taxes paid by fund managers on the
value they derive from their carried interests in funds. Under the carried
interest proposals, fund managers would be the ones who pay higher taxes,
but they are not the only ones who could suffer adverse economic
consequences. The carried interest legislation puts fund investors at risk too,
and not just because managers may try to raise management fees or carry
rates or because overall fund profitability may decline. Rather, the carried
interest legislation puts fund investors at risk of bearing more than their share
of economic losses, at risk because managers might take increased risks with
the fund assets, and at risk from other changes to the investors' economic
relationships with managers.
The risks are raised not directly, but rather indirectly, as a result of
common fund agreement provisions, specifically clawback provisions and
tax distribution provisions. These may appear to be reasonable, carefully
negotiated provisions that are part of industry norms for fund agreements.
However, as this Article explains, these provisions, when coupled with an
increase in the taxes imposed on carried interests, can have return-reducing
ripple effects for fund investors. The route through which investors'
economic interests could be affected may be complex, technical, and subtle,
but the effect could be significant. And this is merely one example of how a
change in law can create unintended consequences by rippling through
private contracts, thereby altering the economic relationships created by
119. This might change the timing of the allocation and distribution to the
GP of the carry, but it should ultimately not change the total amount of the carry to
which the GP is entitled.
120. The other approaches described as possibilities in response to the
clawback issue (specifically (i) taking into account the GP's tax loss when
calculating the after-tax cap on the carry and (ii) adding a limited DRO) are relevant
to clawbacks but not to tax distributions.
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those contracts and adversely affecting parties who are not the desired targets
of the law change.
Ultimately, the carried interest legislation may not be explicitly
aimed at fund investors, but fund investors ought to be aware of how the
legislation could affect them. Armed with that knowledge, fund investors can
decide whether to accept the potential consequences or whether to protect
themselves by negotiating about the details of the fund agreements. Either
way, fund investors need to know that (and how) they may be vulnerable.
